We investigate the macroeconomic consequences of narrow banking in the context of stock-flow consistent models. We begin with an extension of the Goodwin-Keen model incorporating time deposits, government bills, cash, and central bank reserves to the base model with loans and demand deposits and use it to describe a fractional reserve banking system. We then characterize narrow banking by a full reserve requirement on demand deposits and describe the resulting separation between the payment system and lending functions of the resulting banking sector. By way of numerical examples, we explore the properties of fractional and full reserve versions of the model and compare their asymptotic properties. We find that narrow banking does not lead to any loss in economic growth when the models converge to a finite equilibrium, while allowing for more direct monitoring and prevention of financial breakdowns in the case of explosive asymptotic behaviour.
Introduction
Narrow banking is a recurrent theme in economics, especially after periods of financial turbulence. For example, in the wake of the Great Depression, several prominent economists proposed a set of reforms known as the Chicago Plan, which included the requirement that banks hold reserves matching the amount of demand deposits (see Phillips (1996) ). The Banking Act of 1935 adopted different measures to promote stability of the banking sector, such as deposit insurance and the separation of commercial and investment banking, but the idea of narrow banking never went away -and neither did financial crises. After the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 the idea came to the fore again, with outlets as diverse as the International Monetary Fund and the Positive Money movement re-examining the benefits of narrow banking for the current financial system (see Kumhof and Benes (2012) , Dyson et al. (2016)) , and in at least one case a government explicitly dedicating resources to debate the idea (see Thoroddsen and Sigurjónsson (2016) ).
More recently, narrow banking attracted a lot of attention in the context the cryptocurrency boom, especially in conjunction with potential introduction of central bank issued digital currencies Barrdear and Kumhof (2016) , Lipton (2016a) , Lipton et al. (2018) . It even made headlines outside academic circles (see Levine (2017) ) when the Federal Reserve Bank of New York denied an application to open an account by TNB USA Inc., which stands for The Narrow Bank a The main feature of a narrow bank is its assets mix. By definition, these assets can include only marketable low-risk liquid (government) securities, cash, or central bank reserves in the amount exceeding its deposit base. As a result, such a bank is immune to market, credit and liquidity risks, and can only be toppled by operational failures that can be minimized, though not eliminated, by using state-of-the-art technology. Consequently, the liabilities of a narrow bank, in the form of demand deposits, are equivalent to currency and provide a maximally safe payment system. Accordingly, a narrow bank does not require deposit insurance with all its complex and poorly understood effects on the system as a whole, including not so subtle moral hazards.
Because loans and other risky securities are excluded from the asset mix of a narrow bank, lending has to be performed by specially constructed lending facilities, which would need to raise funds from the private sector and the government before lending them out, in contrast to fractional reserve banks who simultaneously create funds and lend them. In other words, narrow banking separates two functions that are traditionally performed together in conventional banking: lending and the payment system.
In practice, a narrow bank and a lending facility as defined above can be combined into a single business, much like the same company can sell both computers and cellphones. All that is necessary is that any bank accepting demand deposits as liabilities be required to hold an equal or greater amount of central bank reserves as assets. In what follows, we take this full reserve requirement as the operational definition of narrow banking and compare it with the current practice of fractional reserve banking.
We perform the analysis in a stock-flow consistent framework similar to that of Laina (2015) but using the model for debt-financed investment proposed in Keen (1995) as a starting point. Apart from the usual technical differences between discrete and continuous-time models, the main advantage of this model is that it allows us to draw conclusions for a growing economy, whereas Laina (2015) is limited to the zero-growth case.
Our two main findings are: (1) narrow banking does not impede growth and (2) whereas it does not entirely prevent financial crises either, it allows for more direct monitoring and preventive intervention by the government. The first finding it significant because a common objection to narrow banking is that removing the money-creation capacity from private banks would lead to a shortage of available funds to finance investment and promote growth. Our results show that this is not the case, with a combination of private and public funds being sufficient to finance investment and lead to economic growth at the same equilibrium rates in both the full and fractional reserve cases. In our view, this result alone is enough to justify a much wider discussion of narrow banking than has occurred so far, as the clear advantages mentioned earlier, such as the reduced need for deposit insurance, do not need to be necessarily weighed against losses in economic growth.
Our second finding is more subtle. In the context of the model analyzed in this paper, a financial crisis is associated with an equilibrium with exploding ratios of private debt and accompanying ever decreasing employment, wage share, and output. We find that such equilibria are present in both the full and fractional reserve cases and are moreover associated with exploding ratios of government lending to the private sector. In the narrow banking case, however, this last variable -namely the ratio of government lending to GDP -exhibits a clearly explosive behaviour much sooner than in the fractional reserve case. Because this is an indicator that is under direct control of the government (as opposed to capital or leverage ratios in the private sector, for example), it is much easier for regulators in the narrow banking case to detect the onset of a crisis and take measures to prevent it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we extend to Keen (1995) model by introducing both demand and time deposits as liabilities of the banking sector, as well as reserves and government bills, in addition to loans, as assets of this sector. Accordingly, we introduce a central bank conducting monetary policy in order to achieve a policy rate on government bills and provide the banking sector with the required amount of reserves. As in the Keen (1995) model, the key decision variable of the private sector is the amount of investment by firms, whereas households adjust their consumption accordingly, with the only added feature of a portfolio selection for households along the lines of Tobin (1969) . Finally, we assume a simplified fiscal policy in the form of government spending and taxation as constant proportions of output.
In Section 3 we modify the model by imposing 100% reserve requirements for banks. This has the effect of limiting bank lending, which now needs to be entirely financed by equity and other borrowing. In the present model, a capital adequacy ratio smaller than 1 can only be maintained by borrowing from the central bank, which can in effect control the total amount of bank lending.
In Section 4 we study the models introduced in Sections 2 and 3 and show how economy can develop under both beneficial and adverse circumstances by way of examples illustrating the properties described earlier. In Section 5 we review our conclusions and outline future research directions.
Fractional reserve banking
We consider a five-sector closed economy consisting of firms, banks, households, a government sector and a central bank as summarized in Table 2 . As it is typical in stock-flow consistent models, the balance sheet, transactions, and flow of funds depicted in this table already encapsulate a lot of the structure in the model, so we start by describing each item in some detail. 
Balance Sheets
Households distribute their wealth into cash, treasury bills, and demand deposits. The total amount of cash in circulation is denoted by H and is a liability for the Central Bank. Treasury bills are short term liabilities of the government sector and pay an interest rate r θ , which plays the role of the main policy rate in the model. For the purposes of this model they can be thought of as being instantaneously issued or redeemed by the government to finance its fiscal policy. Because of this feature, their unit value is deemed to be constant. The total amount of treasuries issued by the government is denoted by Θ and is divided into the holdings Θ h of households, Θ b of banks and Θ cb of the central bank as specified shortly. Demand deposits are liabilities of the banking sector redeemable by cash and paying an interest rate r m . Observe that we assume for simplicity that households do not make loans from banks. A more complete model can include consumer credit in addition to the credit for firms treated in this paper, but we defer this to further work. The firm sector produces a homogeneous good used both for consumption and investment. It utilizes capital with monetary value denoted by pK where p is the unit price of the homogenous good. The capital stock of firms is partially financed by loans with total value L at an interest rate r.
The balance sheet of banks consist of demand deposits M and time deposits D as liabilities and firm loans L, treasury bills Θ b and central bank reserves R as assets. The key feature of fractional reserve banking is that banks are required to maintain a reserve account with the central bank at the level
for a constant 0 ≤ f < 1. We assume that banks maintain this required level of reserves by selling and buying treasury bills to and from the central bank. Observe that no reserve requirement is assumed for time deposits. Finally, the public sector is divided into a government that issues bills to finance its fiscal deficit (essentially the difference between spending and taxation) and a central bank that issues cash and reserves as liabilities and purchases bills as part of its monetary policy.
The column sums along the balance sheet matrix indicate the net worth of each sector, whereas the row sums are all equal to zero with the exception of the capital stock, as each financial asset for one sector correspond to a liability of another. Observe that we assume that the central bank has constant zero net worth, which in particular implies that it transfers all profits back to the government.
Transactions and Flow of Funds
Having defined the balance sheet items, the transactions in Table 2 are selfexplanatory and lead to the financial balances, or savings, indicated as the column sum for each sector. We now describe how these financial balances are redistributed among the corresponding balance sheet items for each sector. Starting with the government sector, we have that
showing that government savings are the negative of deficit spending and interest paid on bills held by the private sector. As this is entirely financed by net issuance of new bills we haveΘ
Moving to firms, once depreciation is taken into account, we find from Table 2 that savings for firms, after paying wages, taxes, interest on debt, and depreciation (i.e consumption of fixed capital), are given by
and corresponds to the internal funds available for investment. In this model, the only source for external financing are loans from the banking sector, so that we havė
where
denotes the after-tax, pre-depreciation profits of the firm sector. The exact distribution of the difference (pI − Π p ) into net new loans and new deposits depends on portfolio decisions by firms, including a desired rate of repayment of existing debt. For simplicity, we adopt the specification in equations (53)- (54) of Grasselli and Nguyen Huu (2015) with the repayment rate set to zero, namely, we assume thatL
The flow of funds for households is slightly more involved, as it requires a choice among different assets. As we can see from Table 2 , the savings of households are given byẊ
is the nominal disposable income of households. These savings are then redistributed among the different balance sheet items held by households so that
To obtain the proportions of savings invested in each type of assets we use the following modified version of the portfolio equations proposed in Chapter 10 of Godley and Lavoie (2007) :
subject to the constraints λ 0 + λ 10 + λ 20 + λ 30 = 1 (2.16)
λ 12 + λ 22 + λ 32 = 0 (2.18)
and the symmetry conditions λ ij = λ ji for all i, j. These correspond to Tobin's prescription for macroeconomic portfolio selection, whereby the proportion of the total wealth invested in each class of assets depends on the rates of returns, with increased demand for one asset leading to decreased demand for all others. For our purposes, the important consequence of (2.12)-(2.15) is thaṫ
The allocations in the remaining assets is now jointly determined by the interaction between the banking sector and the central bank. To being with, the reserve requirement (2.1) imposes thaṫ
where we used (2.8) and (2.22). Next, the fact that the central bank transfers all profits to the government sector implies thaṫ
where we used (2.8), (2.20) and (2.22). Finally, denoting bank profits by
we see that the the holding of treasury bills by banks satisfieṡ
where we used (2.7), (2.22), and (2.28). At this point it is instructive to observe that it follows from (2.21), (2.29) and (2.31) thaṫ
in accordance with (2.3).
Additional Behavioural Assumptions
To complete the model, we need to specify several additional behavioural assumptions for each sector. For this, let us first introduce the following intensive variables
In addition, let the total working age population be denoted by N and the number of employed workers by E. We then define the productivity per worker a, the employment rate e and the nominal wage rate as 34) whereas the unit cost of production, defined as the wage bill divided by quantity produced, is given by
We will assume throughout that productivity and workforce grow exogenously according to the dynamicsȧ
Wage-price dynamics: For the price dynamics we assume that the long-run equilibrium price is given by a constant markup m ≥ 1 times unit labor cost, whereas observed prices converge to this through a lagged adjustment with speed η p > 0. Using the fact that the instantaneous unit labour cost is given by u c = ωp, we obtain:ṗ
We assume that the wage rate w follows the dynamicṡ w w = Φ(e) + γṗ p (2.38)
for a constant 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. This assumption states that workers bargain for wages based on the current state of the labour market through the Philips curve Φ, but also take into account the observed inflation rates. The constant γ represents the degree of money illusion, with γ = 1 corresponding to the case where workers fully incorporate inflation in their bargaining. For the Philips curve, we assume that Φ(e) → +∞ as e → 1 in order to prevent the employment rate from going above unit.
Fiscal policy: We consider the simplest case of real government spending and taxation given by
for constants g and t.
Investment, production and consumption: As in the Keen (1995) model, we assume that the relationship between capital and output is given by Y = K ν for a constant capital-to-output ratio. There are many ways to relax this condition, for example by introducing a variable utilization rate as in Grasselli and Nguyen-Huu (2018) , but we will not pursue them here. Capital itself is assumed to change according toK
where δ is a depreciation rate. Moreover, we assume that real investment is given by
for a function κ of the profit share
Using (2.42), (2.41) and Y = K ν , we find that the growth rate of real output is given by
Furthermore, still in line with the original Keen model, we assume that all output is sold, so that there are no inventories or any difference between supply and demand. Accordingly, real consumption of households is given by
Bank dividends: There are many alternative definitions of bank behaviour that are compatible with the accounting structure described in Table 2 . For example, in Godley and Lavoie (2007) , it is assume throughout the book that all bank profits are immediately distributed to households, so that the financial balances of banks is always identically zero and, consequently, the net worth of banks is kept constant. The problem with this approach is that, in a growing economy, it leads to vanishing capital ratios, as loans and deposits continue to grow while the equity of the bank remains constant. In Grasselli and Lipton (2018) this was remedied by assuming that banks target a regulatory capital ratio k r and distribute profits accordingly. For the present model, this assumption translates into 46) that is, we assume that banks distribute enough dividends to keep equity equal to a multiple k r of risk-weighted assets. For simplicity, we take ρ L = 1 and ρ g = ρ r = 0, but the same general argument applies to arbitrary risk weights. Because bank savings need to equal the change in bank equity (i.e net worth), we have that 47) which in turn implies that bank dividends are
Looking back at the expressions involving bank dividends, we see from (2.10) that nominal disposable income for households is equal to
and from (2.31) that the holding of bills by banks satisfieṡ
The main dynamical system
The dynamics for the wage share ω = w/(pa) obtained from (2.36), (2.37) and (2.38) isω
For the employment rate e = Y /(aN ), we use (2.36), (2.44) to obtaiṅ
Similarly, for the firm variables ℓ = L/(pY ) and
Finally, for the ratio of bank holdings of bills θ b = Θ b /(pY ), we can use (2.50) to obtainθ
We then find that (2.51)-(2.52) and (2.58)-(2.59) lead to the following system of ordinary differential equations:
To solve (2.61), it is necessary to specify the behavioural functions Φ(·) and κ(·). For the Philips curve we follow Grasselli and Nguyen Huu (2015) and choose Φ(e) = φ 1 (1 − e) 2 − φ 0 (2.64) for constants φ 0 , φ 1 specified in Table 2 . For the investment function, we follow the more recent work of Pottier and Nguyen-Huu (2017) and use
that is to say, a generalized logistic function with parameters given in Table 2 . Once the main system (2.61) is solved for the state variables (ω, e, ℓ, m f ), we can use them to solve the following auxiliary system for the variables (θ h , θ b ) derived from (2.54) and (2.60):
where θ p is total private holding of government bills:
we can then find the following remaining variables separately by solving each of the following auxiliary equations:
The system (2.61) is very similar to the system analyzed in Section 4 of Grasselli and Nguyen Huu (2015) if one sets the speculative flow F = 0 in their equation (46). We therefore do not repeat the analysis of the equilibrium points of (2.61), except for observing that it admits an interior equilibrium characterized by a profit share defined as
and corresponding to non-vanishing wage share and employment rate, finite private debt, and a real growth rate of
In addition, system (2.61) admits a variety of equilibria characterized by infinite debt ratios and a real growth rate converging to κ 0 /ν−δ < 0. In Section 4 we explore the properties of these different equilibria in the context of the present model.
Narrow banking
Several alternative definitions for narrow banking have been summarized in Pennacchi (2012) 
Full Reserve Banking
The simplest form of narrow banking corresponds to financial institutions that have only demand deposits as liabilities and are required to hold an equal amount of reserves as assets, which in the context of the model of Section 2 this corresponds to setting f = 1. These institutions can, in principle, also hold cash or excess reserves as assets in addition to required reserves, with the difference between total assets and demand deposits corresponding to shareholder equity, or net worth in the notation of the previous section. For simplicity, in accordance with assigning a risk weight ρ r = 0 to reserves, we assume that Full Reserve Banks maintain zero net worth, so that required reserves equal demand deposits at all times. b In practice, even a bank holding only reserves as assets should have a small positive net worth to absorb losses due to operational risk, but we will neglect this effect here. Similarly, because we are assuming zero-interest on reserves, in practice a full reserve bank would need to charge a service fee in order to be able to pay interest on demand deposits and generate a profit. We neglect this effect also and assume that r m = 0 so that our full reserve bank operates with zero profit. In other words, a Full Reserve Bank in our model corresponds to the following balance sheet structure:
Lending Facilities
These correspond to a financial institution that holds treasury bills and loans as assets and time deposits as liabilities. At an operational level, in the context of the model of Section 2 a lending facility acquires time deposits when a household decides b Observe that the assumption of zero net worth is made throughout in Godley and Lavoie (2007) for the entire banking sector, not only for narrow banks. c Notice that we have been ignoring operational costs of the banking sector all along, for example by assuming that they pay no wages to employees, and the assumption of zero profits for a full reserve bank is not much stronger.
to reallocate part of its wealth away from other assets. For example, a household can transfer funds from its demand deposit account with a Full Reserve Bank into a time deposit account in a Lending Facility. This is accompanied by a transfer of reserves from the Full Reserve Bank to the Lending Facility. Similarly operations take place when households reallocate their wealth from cash and government bills into time deposits, all leading to an increase in reserves temporarily held by the Lending Facility.
These excess reserves (as there is no reserve requirements for time deposits) can then either be used to to purchase bills from the central bank or to create a new loan, which results in the excess reserves being transferred back to the Full Reserve Bank, but this time as a demand deposit for the borrowing firm.
The key feature of narrow banking is that the Lending Facility is not able to create new time deposits simply by creating new loans. Instead, the Lending Facility needs to first obtain excess reserves in the amount of the new loan. One way to obtain excess reserves is by attracting time deposits as described above. Another consists of selling government bills to the central bank. In other words, lending corresponds to an asset swap, without any expansion of the balance sheet of the Lending Facility.
In addition, the Lending Facility is constrained by the minimal capital requirement (2.46), which in this case reduces to
We can see that whenever D drops below (1 − k r )L, the only way for the Lending Facility to meet its minimal capital requirement is by borrowing from the government.
d
To summarize, a Lending Facility in our model corresponds to the following balance sheet structure:
As we mentioned in Section 1, a Full Reserve Bank and a Lending Facility can be owned and managed as a single bank with two distinct business lines. The key point is that demand deposits need to be matched with an equal amount of central bank reserves, regardless of the remaining mix of assets and liabilities of the bank.
For our purposes, as narrow banking regime is therefore characterized by a banking sector with for which f = 1 in (2.1). In the next section we compare the properties of fractional and full reserve banking through a series of numerical examples.
d Observe that this is essentially the same mechanism explained in the section "Bank lending under the Sovereign Money system" of Thoroddsen and Sigurjónsson (2016) .
Numerical Experiments
We perform four experiments to demonstrate the properties of the model under different reserve requirements. In all cases we use the base parameters shown in Table 2 . Details on the parameters used for the wage, employment, and inflation parts of the model, namely α, β, η p , m, ν and δ can be found in Grasselli and Maheshwari (2018) , whereas an in-depth discussion of the properties of the investment function and its parameters, namely κ i , i = 1, . . . , 4 and ξ can be found in Pottier and Nguyen-Huu (2017) . The remaining parameters, namely the interest rates r, r D , r θ and r m , the capital adequacy ratio k r , and the constants g and t related to government spending and taxation are used for illustration only and are based on recent representative values in advanced economies. Initial conditions for each experiment are indicated in the figures showing the results. We begin with an example of fractional reserve banking where the main system (2.61) reaches an interior equilibrium. We take f = 0.1 as the required reserve ratio and choose a moderate level of loan ratio ℓ 0 = 0.6 as an initial condition. As shown in the left panel of Figure 1 , the state variables for (2.61) converge to the equilibrium (ω,λ,l,m f ) = (0.6948, 0.9706, 4.1937, 0.7577) .
(4.1)
The profit share corresponding to this equilibrium according to (2.62) iŝ π = 0.1249, leading to a growth rate of real output of g(π) = 0.0451 according to (2.44). These are very good approximations to the theoretical values π = 0.1248 and g(π) = 0.0450 obtained from (2.72) and (2.73).
The right panel of Figure 1 shows convergence of the other variables of the model to finite values. In particular, observe that although the loan ratio ℓ and the deposit ratios d, m f and m h all increase before stabilizing at their equilibrium values, the ratio θ b of bills held by the banking sector remains close to its small initial value θ b = 0.1, indicating the usual money market interactions between banks and the central bank. We consider next an example of fractional reserve banking where the main system (2.61) approaches an equilibrium with infinite private debt and vanishing wage share and employment rate. As before, we take f = 0.1 as the required reserve ratio but modify the initial loan ratio to ℓ 0 = 6, that is to say, ten times larger than in the previous example. Admittedly, this is an extreme initial condition e , chosen here for e The level of domestic credit to the private sector as a proportion of GDP (which is approx-illustrative purposes. The key point is that, as shown in Grasselli and Nguyen Huu (2015) , explosive equilibria of this type for (2.61) are locally stable for a wide range of parameters, and therefore cannot be ignored from the outset. As shown in the left panels of Figure 2 , both the loan and deposit ratios ℓ and m f for firms eventually explode to infinity in this example, dragging the economy down with a growth rate −0.0522 and causing the wage share and employment rate to converge to zero. The remaining variables of the model are shown in the right panel of Figure 2 , where we can see the household holdings of cash, demand and time deposits, and bills all exploding to infinity. Characteristically, we see that θ b → −∞, indicating that the banking sector needs to borrow from the government in order to keep its equity ratio at the desired level k r .
Example 4.3. (narrow banking with finite equilibrium)
In this example we use the same parameters as in Example 4.1 with the only difference that f = 1, namely, we impose a 100% reserve requirement. We also use the same initial conditions as in Example 4.1, except for mf 0 and d 0 , which need to be calculated differently to achieve the required capital ratio in this case.
The left panel of Figure 3 shows the state variables of (2.61) converging to essentially the same equilibrium as before, namely (ω,λ,l,m f ) = (0.6948, 0.9706, 4.1929, 0.6462), (4.2) corresponding to a profit share and growth rates that are identical up to four decimal places. Notably, narrow banking does not lead to any loss in equilibrium growth for the economy. The only significant departure from the fractional banking case of Example 4.1 is that θ b drops to negative values almost immediately and continues to become more and more negative as ℓ increases towards its equilibrium value. In other words, in the full reserve case the banking sector needs to borrow more from the government in order to increase its lending to the private sector. In this example we use f = 1 and the same values for parameters and initial conditions as in Example 4.2 except for mf 0 and d 0 , which again need to be calculated differently to achieve the required capital ratio in the full reserve case.
As in Example 4.2, we see in the left panel of Figure 4 that the high initial level of debt for the firm sector leads to an explosive behaviour for the variables ℓ and m f in system (2.61) and corresponding collapse of output, wages and employment. The essential difference is that this occurs much earlier in the narrow banking case, namely output begins to decrease shortly after 20 years of debt accumulation, as oppose to after nearly 70 years in the fractional banking case. Moreover, as we can see in the right panel of Figure 4 , the reliance of the banking sector on borrowing from the government is much more pronounced in the narrow banking case, with θ b surpassing (i.e becoming more negative than) −1 within a few years.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered two stock-flow consistent economic models: (A) one with the traditional fractional reserve banking sector and (B) one with the narrow banking sector. We analyzed their similarities and differences and demonstrated that both can operate in a satisfactory fashion, with a narrow banking system exhibiting features that allow for better monitoring and prevention of crises by regulators. Crucially, the version of the model with a 100% reserve requirement for demand deposits did not suffer from any loss of economic growth when compared with the fractional reserve version.
Several improvements can be made to the base model presented here, adding realism at the expense of tractability, as expected. One relates to the usual criticism that the Keen model does not incorporate a realistic consumption function, variable utilization of capital, and inventory management. All of these features can be added to the current model essentially in the same way as in Grasselli and Nguyen-Huu (2018) , with the corresponding increase in dimensionality for the system. Similarly, adding stochasticity to some of the underlying economic variables, such as productivity growth, is an important open task that should be carried out along the lines developed in Nguyen Huu and Costa-Lima (2014) and Lipton (2016b) . Specifically related to the topic of this paper, a natural extension consists in restricting the supply of credit to firms when the level of government lending to the private sector is deemed too high, as a potential stabilization policy. This can be done with the addition of a credit rationing mechanism similar to what is proposed in Dafermos et al. (2017) . In a similar vein, default by both firms and banks is a very important aspect that needs to be incorporated into the model.
In light of the oversized role that banking and finance play in modern economies, effective regulation of the banking sector remains the number one priority for achieving systemic stability. Narrow banking is a compelling policy tool with a long pedigree but poorly understood properties. While advances in technology make the implementation of narrow banking more feasible than it has ever been, concerns about the macroeconomic consequences of the policy persist, in particular with respect to growth. For example, voters in a recent referendum in Switzerland resoundingly rejected a narrow banking proposal largely because of the uncertainties surrounding the idea f We hope to have contributed to the discussion by showing that the advantages of narrow banking merit serious consideration by regulators f See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-vote-sovereign/swiss-voters-reject-campaign-toradically-alter-banking-system-idUSKBN1J60C0 and policy makers.
The baseline parameters for our simulations are provided in Table 2 . Alternative values for some specific parameters are provided in the legend of each figure. Table 2 . With a moderate value for the initial loan ratio ℓ 0 = 0.6 we observe convergence to an interior equilibrium. Observe the negative values for θ b throughout the period. Table 2 . With a high value for the initial loan ratio ℓ 0 = 6 we observe convergence to an equilibrium with infinite private debt.
